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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RICHARD ANTHONY NICHOLS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20020686-CA

INTRODUCTION
Contrary to the State's arguments in its response to Richard Nichols9 (Nichols)
opening brief, Nichols' convictions should be reversed on appeal because: (A) the
evidence was insufficient to support Nichols' convictions, (B) public policy requires that
Nichols' convictions be reversed, and (C) the trial court abused its discretion by usurping
the role of the prosecutor during its interrogation of witnesses.
ARGUMENT
A.

NICHOLS' CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THERE
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS
Contrary to the State's argument, Nichols' convictions on counts 6, 7, 10, 12, 13,

and 19 should be reversed because there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to
support these convictions.
First, counts 6 and 7 should be reversed for insufficient evidence. In counts 6 and
7, the State claims the evidence established that Warren Dinter (Dinter) placed his

vehicle "on consignment with" Nichols. Aple. Brf. at 16. This is false. Although Dinter
left his vehicle at Remember When, he did not ever consign it to Remember When. R.
202:42-43. The State also claims there is no testimony describing Nichols9 voice; thus,
Albert Sanchez's (Sanchez) testimony that he spoke to Nichols on the phone is credible,
even though Sanchez could not identify Nichols' voice. Aple. Brf. at 18. However, John
Neeway (Neeway) testified that Nichols' voice was "very distinctive" because it was
"[d]eep, res[o]nating, would fill a room." R. 202:89-90. Therefore, because Sanchez
spoke to the same voice during both phone conversations but could not identify Nichols'
voice, it is likely that Sanchez did not talk to Nichols but to Mike Gent (Gent), who
admitted he spoke to Sanchez over the phone. R. 203:280. Finally, the State argues this
Court should assume Sanchez, if asked, would have testified that Gent redid the
paperwork for tax purposes. Aple. Brf. at 18-19. However, the absence of testimony, if
anything, suggests Sanchez would not have testified as such. See, e.g., Tisco
Intermountain & State Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n. 744 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Utah 1987)
(holding "it cannot be assumed that facts exist" in the absence of evidence). Thus,
Gent's testimony is the only evidence to support his story that he redid Nichols'
paperwork and the trial court expressly found that it would not rely on Gent's testimony
without corroboration. R. 203:281-82; 204:473,489.
Second, count 10 should be reversed for insufficient evidence. In count 10, the
State claims Nichols misquoted Neeway's testimony. Aple. Brf. at 22. However,

2

Neeway's full statement, like the portion quoted in Nichols' opening brief, shows
Nichols called Neeway to inform him of a pending sale and to request a copy of the title
so he could proceed with the sale.1 The State also claims Nichols is asking this Court to
accept his testimony over Neeway's about the date on which Nichols called Neeway.
Aple. Brf. at 20. However, the trial court itself rejected Neeway's testimony. Neeway
testified that Nichols called him on May 17,1999, not on May 12 as the trial court
suggests in its findings, and the trial court rejected May 17 as a feasible date.2 R. 202:9091, 97-100; 204:479-80. Therefore, the trial court rejected Neeway's testimony about the
date of the phone call. Accordingly, the only evidence remaining was Nichols' testimony
that he called Neeway on May 8, 1999, and Neeway faxed the title four days later;
Neeway's testimony that he previously stated in a letter to the Attorney General's Office
that Nichols called him on May 8,1999; and the date on the faxed title that reads May
12, 1999. R. 202:98-100; 203:362-63. This evidence supports the argument that Nichols
called Neeway directly following the sale of the vehicle to tell Neeway there was a
pending sale and he needed a copy of the title to proceed.
Third, counts 12 and 13 should be reversed for insufficient evidence. In counts 12
1

Neeway's full statement reads, "That there was a sale-that somebody was
interested in purchasing the vehicle, that he needed the information off the title to secure
documentation to sell it. Something along that line." R. 202:90-91.
2

The trial court incorrectly found that Neeway testified Nichols called him on
May 12, 1999. R. 204:479. Neeway testified that Nichols called him on May 17, 1999.
R. 202:90-91, 97-99. The only reference to May 12,1999, was the date on the faxed title
which Neeway expressly rejected as a plausible date. R. 202:98-99.
3

and 13, the State argues Nichols cannot cite Paul Nipper's (Nipper) affidavit because it is
not in the record. Aple. Brf. at 24-25; see. Addendum A. However, Nichols can cite
Nipper's affidavit because this Court granted a motion to supplement the record on
appeal with Nipper's affidavit on June 5, 2003. See Addendum B.
Finally, count 19 should be reversed for insufficient evidence. In count 19, the
State argues Nichols' conviction should not be reversed because the evidence was
"sufficient to prove [Nichols'] complicity in the fraudulent scheme." Aple. Brf. at 12.
However, to prove Nichols was guilty of racketeering, the State had to first prove
Nichols was guilty of a pattern of unlawfuil activity, meaning it had to prove Nichols was
guilty of the communications fraud counts. Because the evidence was insufficient to
support Nichols' convictions of communications fraud, as discussed above, it was also
insufficient to support his conviction of racketeering.
B*

NICHOLS' CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THEY
ARE AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
The State argues that Nichols' convictions are not against public policy because

the evidence of Nichols' "participation in the scheme was more than a general
knowledge of the financial problems the dealership was experiencing." Aple. Brf. at 13.
To support its argument, the State cites Gent's testimony that Nichols, Gent and John
Douglas (Douglas) attended a meeting in January 1999 where they decided to "sell more
cars and use the proceeds from those sales to pay for delinquent obligations." Id.
However, Gent's testimony is the only testimony about a specific January meeting and
4

the trial court expressly found that Gent's testimony, without corroboration, was not
credible. R. 204:473,489. The other testimony at trial suggested that Remember When
was not experiencing financial difficulty in January 1999 so there was no reason for a
meeting in January to discuss financial difficulties. R. 203:398; 204:462-63.
Moreover, in making its argument, the State cites Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-803
(1998) for the idea that the consignee should receive commissions not profits for the sale
of a consigned vehicle. Aple. Brf. at 13. It is important to emphasize that the consignee
discussed in section 41-3-803 is the dealership, not Nichols. See. Utah Code Ann. § 413-802 (1998). By citing this statute, the State attributes to Nichols far more
responsibility than he actually had. Nichols was a salesman at Remember When. R.
203:402; 204:458. He was not an owner or operator. R. 203:290-91; 204:451-53. He
did not handle titles or payments to consignors. R. 204:452-55,458,467. Most
important, he did not benefit from the illegal activities engaged in at Remember When.
R. 204:467,473. To convict a salesman for selling cars without evidence that he did so
with direct knowledge of illegality or for personal gain through illegal means runs
against public policy. Therefore, contrary to the State's argument, Nichols' convictions
should be reversed because they are against public policy.
C.

NICHOLS' CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY USURPING THE ROLE
OF PROSECUTOR DURING ITS INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES
"Rule 614 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows the court to 'interrogate

5

witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party.'" State v. Bovatt 854 P.2d 550, 553
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). The trial court, "within
reasonable bounds," may "ask questions of any witness who may be on the stand for the
purpose of eliciting the truth, or making clear any points that otherwise would remain
obscure.'" State v. Gleason, 86 Utah 26,40 P.2d 222,227 (Utah 1935). However, the
trial court "should not indulge in extensive examination or usurp the function of
counsel." Id Instead, "sincerity and fairness should characterize [it]s every word and
action." Id,
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by usurping the role of prosecutor
during its interrogation of witnesses because it: (1) elicited evidence in disregard of its
previous rulings, (2) elicited inadmissible evidence, and (3) ignored Nichols' objections.
1.

The Trial Court Erred By Eliciting Evidence In Disregard of Its Previous
Rulings.
The State argues the trial court did not err by eliciting Cruisin' Classics evidence

because such evidence was relevant to defendant's credibility. See Aple. Brf. at 27-28.
However, the trial court's error was not that it elicited irrelevant evidence, but that it
elicited evidence in violation of its own ruling.
The rules of evidence exist to "secure fairness in administration" and develop the
"law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined." Utah R. Evid. 102. In keeping with this purpose, a trial court, once it has
made an evidentiary ruling in a trial, must enforce that ruling consistently. See State v.
6

Stone, 629 P.2d 442,445-46 (Utah 1981) (suggesting error where trial court sustained
objection that appeared "inconsistent with [its] earlier decision"); State v. Malone. 2002
N.C. App. LEXIS 1990, *15 (N.C. Ct. App. May 7, 2002) (No. COA01-262) (holding
trial court erred by agreeing to instruct jury that exhibits were illustrative but then giving
instruction that exhibits were substantive). Specifically, a trial court cannot elicit
testimony during its interrogation of witnesses that the prosecution, based on previous
rulings, could not have elicited. See. United States v. Victoria, 837 F.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir.
1988) (holding it was "every bit as improper, and probably more so, for a trial judge" to
elicit testimony that the prosecution could not have elicited); Williams v. United States.
93 F.2d 685, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1937) (holding trial court erred by "propounding leading
and suggestive questions that would not have been permitted to the prosecutor himself1).
In this case, the trial court erred by making an evidentiary ruling and excluding
itself from enforcement of the ruling. During the prosecution's case, the trial court
stopped Nichols' cross examination of Bryce Greer (Greer), even though the State had
not objected, and ruled of its "own volition" that evidence about Cruisin5 Classics had no
"bearing on this case" and would not be considered "at all" in the court's decision. R.
203:440. Later, Nichols objected to the State's cross examination of Douglas because
the State was eliciting Cruisin' Classics evidence. R. 204:458-59. In response, the trial
court asked the State whether it was "referring to Cruisin' Classics o r . . . Remember
When" and caused the State to reword its question to avoid eliciting Cruisin' Classics

7

evidence. R. 204:459. Then, just minutes after reiterating its ruling that Cruisin'
Classics evidence was inadmissible, the trial court itself violated this ruling by
questioning Douglas about Cruisin' Classics.3 R. 204:465-66.
Furthermore, the "error should have been obvious to the trial court.11 State v.
Adams. 2000 UT 42,^20, 5 P.3d 642. The trial court was obviously aware of the
existence of the ruling because it made the ruling twice, the second time just moments
before it violated the ruling by questioning Douglas about Cruisin' Classics. R. 203:440;
204:458-59. The trial court was also obviously aware of the scope of the ruling because,
just moments before it elicited evidence about Cruisin' Classics, it caused the State to
reword a question to avoid any reference to Cruisin' Classics at all. R. 204:459.
Moreover, it was obvious that Douglas was testifying about Cruisin' Classics. Although
Douglas did not name Cruisin' Classics as the partnership he testified to, he must have
been talking about Cruisin' Classics because Douglas himself owned Remember When
3

The relevant part of the trial court's interrogation of Douglas reads as follows:
THE COURT: What was Mr. Nichols' position after January of 1999 at
Remember When?
THE WITNESS: It is my understanding that first of all he was the sales manager
for Mr. Gent and then became a partner with Mr. Gent.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, lack of foundation and hearsay.
THE COURT: How did you determine that?
THE WITNESS: I was told by several people that were involved with the
business and by the landlord that Mr. Nichols and Mr. Gent were forming some type of
partnership.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, same objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I'm talking before June 13th of 1999.
THE WITNESS: That's correct.
R. 204:465-66.
8

so Gent and Nichols could not have formed a partnership at Remember When. See R.
203:256, 290, 336-37; 204:459,471.
Finally, the trial court's error was harmful. Error is harmful where "the likelihood
of a different outcome [in the absence of the error is] sufficiently high [so as] to
undermine confidence in the verdict." Adams. 2000 UT 42 at ^20 (quotations and
citation omitted) (alterations in original). In this case, the error was harmful because it
caused the trial court to reject Nichols' theory at trial. Nichols' trial theory was that Gent
and Douglas committed the acts of communications fraud for which he was charged.
Through Cruisin' Classics evidence, Nichols sought to show he did not know Gent was
committing fraud until he became Gent's victim. However, the trial court stopped
Nichols from presenting this testimony and expressly disregarded it. R. 203:440. Later,
the trial court elicited other Cruisin' Classics evidence showing Nichols and Gent were
partners and relied on this evidence. R. 204:465-66,477. If the trial court had admitted
all Cruisin' Classics evidence, it would have seen Nichols was one of Gent's victims. If
it had admitted no Cruisin' Classics evidence, it would not have known Gent and Nichols
were partners.4 Either way, the outcome likely would have been more favorable to
Nichols.

4

At most, the trial court would have known Gent worked for Nichols briefly but
Nichols fired him. See R. 203:411-13, 429-31,434-36.
9

2.

The Trial Court Erred By Admitting Inadmissible Evidence During Its
Interrogation of Douglas.
The State argues the trial court did not err by admitting inadmissible evidence

during its interrogation of Douglas because the trial court "appears to have disregarded
the testimony" and there was other evidence to support the trial court's finding that
Nichols was not credible. Aple. Brf. at 28-29. However, this argument addresses only
the harm element of plain error and it fails to show why the trial court's elicitation of and
reliance on inadmissible evidence was not so harmful that it must have affected the
outcome of the trial.
A trial court, when it interrogates a witness, is bound by the same rules of
evidence the prosecution and defense are bound by. See Utah R. Evid. 1101 (stating that
the rules of evidence "apply to all actions and proceedings in the courts of this state"
unless they fall under an enumerated exception). Consequently, a trial court cannot,
during its interrogation of a witness, elicit evidence that the prosecution could not have
elicited if it had been performing the interrogation. See United States v. Victoria. 837
F.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding it was "every bit as improper, and probably more so,
for a trial judge" to elicit testimony that the prosecution could not have elicited);
Williams v. United States. 93 F.2d 685, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1937) (holding trial court erred
by "propounding leading and suggestive questions that would not have been permitted to
the prosecutor himself1); State v. Cox. 255 S.E.2d 660, 662 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)
(reversing because trial court used its interrogation to emphasize hearsay evidence). In
10

this case, the trial court erred by eliciting inadmissible evidence during its interrogation
of Douglas. During the trial court's interrogation, Douglas explained that he had
obtained the information for part of his testimony from "several people" and "the
landlord." R. 204:465-66. Instead of striking the testimony Douglas had obtained from
these unspecified people, the trial court continued its interrogation and left the hearsay
information on the record as evidence.
Moreover, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. Hearsay is "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c).
Under this definition, all information that Douglas received from "several people" and
"the landlord" is hearsay. R. 204:465-66. "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided
by law or by [the Utah Rules of Evidence]." Utah R. Evid. 802. The hearsay evidence in
this case does not fit any hearsay exception and the State has not argued that it does.
Thus, the hearsay testimony that Douglas offered was "obviously inadmissible." See
Cox, 255 S.E.2d at 662. Further, even if the evidence was not readily recognizable as
hearsay, Nichols objected to the testimony and explained to the court that the evidence
was hearsay and lacked foundation. Once Nichols objected, the trial court was put on
notice that it was eliciting inadmissible evidence and should have ruled on the objection
and cured the record of the inadmissible evidence. See Id.
Finally, the error was harmful. In Cox, the appellate court determined the trial

11

court's focus on hearsay during its interrogation was "so prejudicial" that it must have
affected the result. Id. at 663. Similarly, in this case, the trial court's error was so
prejudicial that it must have and did affect the result. Because the rules of evidence
prevented the State from eliciting the testimony the trial court felt was necessary to make
the State's case, the trial court usurped the role of prosecutor and elicited the necessary
evidence itself by violating the rules of evidence. Then, regardless of its inadmissible
nature, the trial court left the evidence on the record and relied on the evidence in its
findings.5 R. 204:477. Moreover, although Cox involved a jury trial, the same result
should be reached here because the trial court expressly relied on the hearsay evidence in
its decision. See Id.6
5

The relevant findings of the trial court read as follows:
There is also a problem of credibility as it relates to []
Gent. Mr. Nichols testified that he didn't like him, didn't
want to socialize with him, wanted nothing virtually to do
with the man, didn't recognized [sic] him as his superior. But
yet the testimony is, by Mr. Douglas, that when Mr. Douglas
indicated to . . . Mr. Nichols[] that Mr. Gent would be the
operator, no problem was ever expressed. Mr. Nichols
continued to send all problems with respect to titles, et cetera
to Mr. Gent and seemed to act as though he were superior in
his dealings with him. Furthermore, after the business was
closed down on June 13th, he opens up another business and
Mr. Gent is either an employee or partner, depending on who
you believe, but they worked together in another business.
R. 204:477.
6

The Utah Supreme Court says evidentiary rulings "are not of such critical
moment" in bench trials because it assumes the trial court "will use his superior
knowledge as to the competency and the effect which should be given evidence." Super
Tire Mkt.» Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132, 136 (Utah 1966). However,
12

3.

The Trial Court Erred By Ignoring Nichols' Objections.
The State argues the trial court did not err by ignoring Nichols' objections because

it "addressed the objections by asking follow-up questions." Aple. Brf. at 28. However,
the court did err because, by ignoring Nichols' objections, it appeared to be favoring the
prosecution.
When a judge is presiding over a bench trial, it must maintain an appearance of
neutrality. See State v. Mellen. 583 P.2d 46,48 (Utah 1978) (holding "a judge should
maintain an attitude of neutrality"); Cunningham v. Housing Auth., 764 F.2d 1097, 1101
(5th Cir. 1985) (holding trial court did not err in ordering deposition because no jury was
present and trial court maintained impartiality). Accordingly, if a trial court chooses to
interrogate a witness, it must not appear to favor the prosecution during its interrogation.
See United States v. GuglielminL 384 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1967) (reversing because
trial court conveyed impression of guilt to jury by engaging in "persistent questioning" of
defense witnesses and making "numerous comments to defense counsel"); United States
v. Beatv. 722 F.2d 1090, 1095 (3d Cir. 1983) (reversing because trial court conveyed
impression of guilt to jury by vigorously engaging in defendant's case but leaving
prosecution's witnesses with "complete freedom from hostile interruption"); United
States v. Singer. 710 F.2d 431,436 (8th Cir. 1983) (reversing because "the jury could

this assumption does not apply here because the trial court, by ignoring its superior
knowledge about the rules of evidence, was able to admit and rely on inadmissible
evidence. R. 204:477.
13

well have inferred that the judge was siding with the government" by his frequent
questions and comments that favored the prosecution). In this case, the trial court erred
because it abandoned the appearance of neutrality during its interrogation of witnesses.
Nichols objected three times during the trial court's interrogation of witnesses and the
trial court ignored all three objections. See. R. 203:309; 204:465-66. By ignoring
Nichols' objections and proceeding as if Nichols had not objected at all, the trial court
lost the appearance of impartiality. Instead of appearing to be a neutral arbitrator, the
trial court appeared to be a supporter of the prosecution that was admitting inadmissible
evidence because it had already decided Nichols was guilty.7
Further, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. Nichols' objections
are clear on the record. See R. 203:309; 204:465-66. The trial court could easily have
paused its interrogation to rule on Nichols' objections immediately or to inform Nichols'
that it would take his objections under consideration. Instead, the trial court repeatedly
ignored Nichols' objections and continued its interrogation.
Finally, the error was harmful. Prejudice is presumed where the defendant is
denied "an impartial trial judge." State v. KelL 2002 UT 106,^}15 n. 2, 61 P.3d 1019
(citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1997) (listing six errors that defy

7

This case is not like State v. Larsen, 849 P.2d 129, 130 (Ida. 1993) (holding trial
court implicitly ruled on "asked and answered" objections by telling witness she could
answer one question and rephrasing the other). Here, the trial court did not implicitly
rule on Nichols' objections because it did not acknowledge the objections, rephrase the
questions, or strike the inadmissible testimony. R. 203:309; 204:465-66.
14

harmless-error analysis)). Here, harm should be presumed. The trial court abandoned
the role of adjudicator and left Nichols5 trial without a judge. It did not matter whether
Nichols objected because there was no judge making evidentiary decisions.
Accordingly, inadmissible evidence was admitted regardless of objection and relied on
by the trier of fact because the evidence was part of the record. See R. 204:477.
CONCLUSION
Nichols requests this Court to reverse his convictions for five counts of
Communications Fraud and one count of Racketeering.
SUBMITTED this jd* day of June, 2003.

Ld^SEPPJ^
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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I, LORI J. SEPPI, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies of
the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building,
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this
IP**- day of June, 2003.

DELIVERED this
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
Jim * Ruth Ludwig,

AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL NIPPER

Plaintiffs,

David E. Nipper, Wayne Curtis,
Kenneth Eskelson, Douglas
Eskelton, Jake Watson, Robert B.
Norton, and Doca 1-100
(Involuntary Plaintiffs)
v.
John Douglas dba T-D
Enterprises, LLC, aka
Remember When Classic
and Performance Motor Cars;
Richard A. Nichols, individually:
David E. Nipper, individually; and
Western Surety Company,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

Civil No. 990407964
Judge Dcnbc P. Lindberg

)
:ss.
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PAUL NIPPER, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows:
1.1 am over 18 years old.
2.1 am the son of David Nipper, a party to the instant action. Because I acted as agent for
David Nipper during much of the pertinent time period that forms the basis for David Nipper's
claims in this case, I have personal knowledge of the events surrounding these claims.
3. On or about Octobej>fTl998, David Nipper and I stopped by the Rjemember When car
lor and discussed with Richard Niohols the procedure for consigning a car to the lot. David
Nipper was Interested in consigning his 1957 black Chevrolet. In this meeting, David Nipper
explained to Nichols that he was going out of tlbe state for a while and that he would have his son,
myself, act as his agent in the sale of the vehicle
4. On or about October 15,1998,1 brought David's 1957 Chevy to Remember When and
completed a consignment sale contract The contract provided that Remember When would pay
David Nipper a minimum of $22,000 after the successful sale of his car. The contract also
provided that Remember When would provide funds to David Nipper within 21 days of the sale.
5. In reliance upon these representations,, I signed the contract on behalf of David Nipper.
Richard A. Nichols signed on behalf of Remember When. In early March of 1999,
I checked the Remember When showroom and discovered that the 1957 Chevy was missing.
None of the people at the shop could tell me where the car was or whether it had been sold. Over a
series of days and visits to Remember When, I finally learned that the vehicle had been sold on or
about January 26,1999.
6.1 demanded payment and was then rebuffed by Remember When, who came up with
one excuse after another for not paying David Nipper for his share of the vehicle sale.
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Finally, Remember When provided me with a check for $22,000., representing to me that the
check was valid, that it would be honored at its bank, and that the check represented ftill payment
for the sale of David Nipper's vehicle.
7. In good faith reliance upon Remember When's representations regarding the 122,000
check, I presented the check to Remember When's Bank. The obeck, however, was not honored
by Remember When's bank. It was reported to me that there were insufficient funds in the
Remember When account. Additional telephone calls to the bank showed that there was never
enough money in the account to cover the check. Finally, a few days later, I called the bank and
found that Remember When had placed a stop payment on the check.
8. Subsequent telephone calls with Remember When yielded deceitthl and misleading
excuses for the failure to honor the check including an allegation that I was an impostar and that
there was a defect with the title.
9. The preceding statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information
and belief, and if called as a witness in this matter I would so testify.
' . day of September, 2000.
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My Commission Expires:
NotaiyPubMo " " " T
VERONICA J0LLEY
|
224 North NwSttrDiH*
Salt lake City. Utah 6*11*
MyCororobf)onE)qp*oa
May £1.2001

.
•
I

SiaieolUtah

J

I

•3-

..,., Tt'i'rr*

801 983 0395

r*/s^r» o*»

PAGE.03

ADDENDUM B
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—00O00

State of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 20020686-CA
v.
Richard Anthony Nichols,
Defendant and Appellant

Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood and Thome.
This matter is before the court upon Appellant's motion,
filed June 5, 2003 to supplement the record on appeal with
Exhibit B, an affidavit of a witness that testified at trial.
Appellee stipulated to the motion.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the record on appeal shall be
supplemented with Exhibit B, submitted by Appellant.
Dated thisj*y£ day of June, 2003.
FOR THE COURT:

